How nationalist Chechens became Muslim insurgents

Is Chechnya’s rebellion the core of a insurgency that became regional, able to mount synchronized attacks in the whole North Caucasus? What are the causes that triggered in the last 3 years an increasingly interconnected Islamist regional insurgency? FP Romania asked Dr. Cerwyn Moore, an expert of the  insurgency in the North Caucasus.

Interview conducted by Octavian Manea with Dr Cerwyn Moore and published in the 2010 May/June issue of the Foreign Policy Romania, the Romanian edition of the US Foreign Policy Magazine.

FP Romania: Although the latest attacks on the Russian subway were claimed by Doku Umarov, the leader of the Chechen secessionist guerilla, the female terrorists were actually native from Dagestan. Are these facts a clear signal that Chechnya’s rebellion became a regional insurgency able to orchestrate synchronized attacks in the whole North Caucasus?
Cerwyn Moore: In part yes – it does appear that Umarov has been able to effectively realise a clandestine infrastructure in support of a broader regional insurgency. Importantly, however, the roots of the regional insurgency actually underpinned the actions of the Islamic Peacekeeping Battalion – led by Basayev and Khattab – in 1999. Since 1999 Basayev – along with a host of supporters – began to establish a system of military jamaats so as to fight a protracted insurgency – and this gained momentum between 2002 and 2005 in which weekly small scale attacks terror operations in Dagestan, Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria become commonplace (including the large-scale incidents in Nazran in June 21st 2004, and the attack on Nal’chik in October 2005). Basayev and his small unit of supporters played a key role militarily – organising the system of military jamaats. However following the death of Maskhadov – the nominal leader of the Chechen-led anti-federal operations from 1999-2005 – in 2005, the establishment of a regional insurgency gained further momentum with the appointment of Abdul Khalim Sadulayev as the new leader of the movement. Maskhadov’s successor, Sadulayev, who gave the regional insurgency a theological raison d’etre, helping to further unite the disparate groups across the North Caucasus who pledged allegiance to the anti-federal insurgency led, ideologically by Sadulayev and militarily by Basayev and others.  So, the 2010 attacks in Moscow by Dagestani bombers – and the further suicide operations in Dagestan and Ingushetia in the week after the Metro bombings – illustrate that the clandestine insurgency – does now have a regional character, but this regional character has long been in the shadows, supporting operations in Chechnya – and undertaking limited attacks in neighbouring republics throughout 2002 and thereafter.

Is it correct to say that the old national, separatist movements from Ingushetia, Dagestan and Chechnya melted away in one increasingly cohesive Islamist regional movement that fight for creating an Emirate of Caucasus? Could you explain how happened the rebranding of the old nationalist secessionist Chechen movement in a Muslim regional insurgency?
Since 1999 two elements vied for influence in the anti-Russian Chechen-led resistance. One group was radical in form and character – adopting the language of militant Islam – and employing a variety of methods. Even though its support base was not huge it had a willingness and capability militarily – given he experience of a number of field commanders who pledged allegiance – to the ruling council – the Majli us-Shura – led by Basayev and Ibn Khattab, amongst others. Another slightly different organisation headed by Aslan Maskhadov existed –called the State Defence Committee – in parallel with the Malji us-Shura. Although the two co-operated in the first years of the second war – the former group took the lead – as moderate supporters of Maskhadov defected to the Russian and federal authorities in 2000 (i.e. Akhmed Kadyrov and the units loyal to Sulim Yamadayev). The Majli us-Shura also had more means – financially and logistically – to present their account of events in the North Caucasus – effectively supported by a number of news outlets. Accordingly, as Russian pressure increasingly weakened the effectiveness of Maskhadov who was ostensibly a moderate leader, in the period between 1999 and mid 2002, a decision was taken to unite the two parallel structures creating the State Defence Committee – Majli us-Shura with Maskhadov as the head of anti-Russian coalition and Basayev in charge of military operations. However the two men disagreed on the nature and form of military operations, a point emphasised after the Moscow Theatre Siege – which Maskhadov did not sanction. Following the Moscow Theatre siege Basayev was relieved of his position in the insurgency by Maskhadov. By this time, however, Maskhadov, while having nominal support from many Chechens, had a limited military infrastructure to continue operations. In contrast, Basayev and his group maintained a credible military capability – effectively launching a terrorist campaign between 2002 and 2004 – whilst also establishing a system of military jamaats across the region to support a protracted regional insurgency. This gained momentum, as noted above, in 2005, and got further purchase after the death of Maskhadov – when Abdul Kahilm Sadulayev took over the leadership of the movement. Although both Sadulayev and Basayev died in 2006, their work establishing the infrastructure for a clandestine regional insurgency had been completed. Umarov took over as leader of the insurgency and the wide-scale poverty in the region, along with the heavy handed measures taken by local federal authorities effectively helped to swell the ranks of the insurgency in 2008 and into 2009, as a new generation of militants came to the fore.

How important was Alexandr Tikhomirov, the so-called “Internet mujahedin”, in creating a new generation of regional militants? Is Alexander Tikhomirov the ideological glue that binds together the fighters from Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan in a decentralized network with the same aim?
Tikhomirov did play an important role publicising the actions of the Caucasus Emirate, especially using the internet. He was, interestingly, a convert to Islam and something of an unknown quantity in the resistance – after joining the ranks. However, his influenced became more marked in late 2009. Nonetheless, the new generation of militants – which are probably not too large in number – are also influenced by other indigenous ideologues who have long since advocated adopting a militant brand of Islam. Likewise, the hard-line federal policies have undoubtedly led to a younger generation of people wanting to take-up arms against federal forces across the region. This cocktail of a regional infrastructure being in place as part of a legacy of the Russo-Chechen War from 1999-2004 and the widespread poverty and corruption, coupled with the increasing influence and accessibility of the internet certainly meant that Tikhomirov gained unprecedented influence in the short time he was associated with the insurgency. In that sense, Tikhomirov was not the glue that held the new generation of militants together, but his star certainly shone brightly for a short period.

What is the source of the problem in the North Caucasus that triggered in latest 3 years an increasingly interconnected Islamist regional insurgency? Are the heavy-handed tactics used by the Russian security forces or the hardline policies (of brutal measures, limiting freedoms and human rights abuses) of Moscow and their local puppet regimes? Or overemphasizing the military solutions in crushing national separatist movements, although it is usually said that insurgencies are structurally 80% economic and just 20% military?
I think it would be wrong to search for a single cause for the growth in the insurgency, as my answers above have suggested. Indeed, the increasingly interconnected and regional character of the insurgency has become more effective since 2004, but suffered heavily between 2004 and 2007 as key figures leading the local jamaats were isolated and eliminated by the federal authorities. The hard-line policies and widespread human rights abuses have undoubtedly led to renewed support – at a local level – for anti-federal operations. The Kremlin and the local authorities have also overemphasised the importance of military solutions – and this - coupled with widespread poverty have given the insurgency renewed vigour in 2009. But it is important not to over-state the influence of the regional insurgency. Federal forces killed upwards of 400 people associated with the insurgency in 2009, according to some reports, but it is unclear how many of these were actually active members of jamaats or were actually involved in local, personal and clan based vendettas. As such, as indicated in the question, I think it is a little bit of everything, framed by the large-scale poverty and corruption in the region, that have led to problems, which cannot be solved by military means alone.

Dr Cerwyn Moore is a lecturer in International Relations at the University of Birmingham. He has published widely on IR theory, post-Soviet security and more specifically on the insurgency in the North Caucasus.