Ukraine is not a priority policy issue for the Obama

Is Ukraine the key to making Russia a superpower again? ? Is the Obama administration approach towards Russia a de facto political message/signal that Washington is no longer interested in pushing the agenda of integrating Ukraine in NATO? FP Romania talked about these issues with Janusz Bugajski, senior fellow of the CSIS in Washington.

FP Romania: Could the results of the current elections be interpreted as the end of the Western path for Ukraine in the foreseeable future?
Janusz Bugajski: That is too simplistic an interpretation. President-elect Victor Yanukovych has stated his commitment to EU integration and to maintain good relations with NATO. It is not in his interest to move Ukraine away from the West and into the Russian orbit as Ukraine would be swallowed politically and economically by Moscow and his own stature would decline. However, Ukraine ’s path toward the West depends on the seriousness and effectiveness of its reform programs in meeting EU standards. Meanwhile, NATO inclusion will remain on hold not only because of Kyiv but also because of the unwillingness of several NATO allies to push for Ukrainian membership as we saw demonstrated at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008.

What are the Russian main interests vis-à-vis Ukraine ? For some voices, Ukraine is the key to making Russia a superpower again. Is Ukraine still the powder keg of the relations between the West & Russia?
Russia has two main interests in Ukraine. First to prevent the country from merging into NATO and establishing close ties with the United States, as well as with neighbors already in the Alliance, including Romania. Second, Russia views Ukraine as an important element in its own reimperialization and in restoring its dominant political and economic role in Eastern Europe . Hence, it either seeks a pliant government in Kyiv that will acquiesce to Moscow’s foreign and security agenda or a divided government that precludes Ukraine’s qualification for EU and NATO membership.

Which are the geopolitical consequences of the US resetting policy for the future of Ukraine? Is a de facto political message/signal that Washington is no longer interested in pushing the agenda of integrating Ukraine in NATO? It seems that Washington is primarily interested to receive Russian cooperation on Iran, North Korea or START treaty. But the cooperation has a price: Moscow needs a very real and tangible offer in exchange. Moscow needs Washington to stand down on the Ukraine issue.
Ukraine is not a priority policy issue for the Obama administration and Washington is not willing to stir conflicts with Russia or with certain NATO members that oppose any fast track toward NATO membership. Washington has also spent the last few months reassuring the new NATO members in Central Europe that its “reset” relationship with Russia will not be conducted at the cost of their security. However, words require actions to be credible and the White House will need to demonstrate its commitment to NATO’s article 5 security guarantees even while it pursues cooperative relations with Moscow. This will require an updating of NATO’s new Strategic Concept to take account threats to the territorial integrity and national security of NATO members bordering Russia.

It seems that the Obama administration is not genuinely interested in promoting the euro-atlantic cause of Ukraine. It is more Kissingerian oriented and interested primarily in accommodating the most sensitive interests of the great powers. Could we speak about a cognitive fault line between the Obama approach and the one of George W. Bush towards Ukraine?
President George W. Bush needed the new NATO members and NATO aspirants to support his policies in Iraq and in the “war on terror” when he encountered significant opposition in Western Europe . Although he made a verbal commitment to Ukraine’s NATO entry, he did not sufficiently prepare the ground for such decisions by building a united front among the Allies. President Barack Obama will not strongly pursue Ukraine’s membership especially as the majority of the Ukrainian public are either opposed to accession or are indifferent in a situation where the new Ukrainian president has talked about a public referendum on NATO before Kyiv petitions for membership.

What about Europe? Ultimately Ukraine is in the backyard of Europe. It should be a European responsibility. With an EU or NATO membership out of the question, what could or should Europe do in order to influence the societal dynamics inside Ukraine? Could we still speak about a European interest to support in Ukraine a societal agenda with an anti-Russia rhetoric/public discourse?
Ukraine is primarily Ukraine’s responsibility and it is up to Ukrainian leaders to pursue a coherent and effective foreign and security policy alongside a package of necessary domestic reforms. The EU’s Eastern Partnership program together with the pending Association Agreement and a free trade area with Ukraine are important markers toward eventual Ukrainian inclusion in the Union. But the impetus must come from the government in Kyiv as the EU simply will not embrace unreformed states where corruption is rampant and where leadership struggles paralyze policy making and implementation. There is no “anti-Russian” rhetoric among key political players in Ukraine or other Central-East European countries. Opposition to Moscow’s policies does not constitute “anti-Russianism” and we must avoid falling into the Kremlin’s trap where criticism of the Russian government is conflated with irrational racism – a maneuver reminiscent of old Soviet practices.

Janusz Bugajski is the holder of the Lavrentiadis Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C.